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EIGHTH AMENDMENT-THE DEATH
PENALTY AND VICARIOUS FELONY
MURDER: NONTRIGGERMAN MAY
NOT BE EXECUTED ABSENT A
FINDING OF AN INTENT TO
KILL
Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
I. INTRODUCTION
In three cases in the past six years the Supreme Court has specifi-
cally avoided reviewing the constitutionality of imposing the death pen-
alty upon a nontriggerman I where a killing has occurred during the
commission of a felony and the nontriggerman neither intended nor an-
ticipated that death would occur.2 In Enmund v. Florida,3 however, the
Court faced the issue and ruled that the eighth amendment's prohibi-
tion against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment bars the im-
position of the death penalty against "one who neither took life,
attempted to take life, nor intended to take life."
'4
The Court relied heavily upon the disproportionality analysis it
had employed in Coker v. Georgia5 to hold that the imposition of the
death penalty on Enmund was unconstitutional. The Court also
stressed that Enmund should not be executed since he did not intend to
kill. However, the Court's failure to adequately define "intent" will
present problems to courts applying Enmund in the future.
Enmund also highlights the divergent approaches the Court has
taken in deciding constitutional questions concerning the death penalty.
I A nontriggerman is a co-felon who does not participate in the physical act of killing.
2 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 609 n.16 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Ohio death
penalty struck down on the grounds that it did not permit the trial court to weigh all of the
mitigating evidence offered by the defendant); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 642 (1978) (plural-
ity opinion) (decided on the basis ofLockelt); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
n.40 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory death sentence struck down).
3 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
4 Id. at 3371 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at i, Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368
(1982)).
5 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that it is unconstitutional to apply the
death penalty to an individual convicted of rape).
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Recent Supreme Court cases have held that trial courts must look at the
individual characteristics of the criminal and of the crime before reach-
ing a sentencing decision. 6 Enmund, however, reflects Justice White's
preference for providing clear and definite guidelines for courts to use in
deciding whether to impose the death penalty. '
II. FACTS OF ENMUND V. FLORIDA
In 1975, Thomas and Eunice Kersey, aged 86 and 74, were robbed
and fatally shot at their farmhouse in central Florida. Sampson Arm-
strong had approached Mr. Kersey at his house, grabbed him, pointed a
gun at him, and told his accomplice, Jeanette Armstrong, to take Mr.
Kersey's money. Mr. Kersey cried out and Mrs. Kersey came out of the
house with a gun. Mrs. Kersey shot Jeanette Armstrong, wounding her.
Sampson Armstrong, and perhaps Jeanette Armstrong, 7 shot and killed
both Mr. and Mrs. Kersey. Earl Enmund and his common-law wife
were waiting for the Armstrongs outside in a car.
Enmund, Sampson Armstrong, and Jeanette Armstrong8 were in-
dicted for the first degree murder and robbery of the Kerseys.9 The
Florida trial court instructed the jury that,
In order to obtain a conviction of first degree murder while engaging
in the perpetration of or in the attempted perpetration of the crime of
robbery, the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was actually present and was actively aiding and abetting the
robbery or attempted robbery, and that the unlawful killing occurred in
the perpetration of or in the attempted perpetration of the robbery.' 0
Both Sampson Armstrong and Enmund were found guilty of two counts
of first degree murder and one court of robbery."I
The jury recommended that the death penalty be applied, and the
6 Se in/ia text accompanying notes 109-11.
7 See infra text accompanying note 19. Though Jeanette Armstrong was accused of mur-
der, the trial judge never determined that she shot the Kerseys.
8 Jeanette Armstrong's trial was severed from the main trial and she was convicted of one
count of robbery and two counts of second degree murder. She was sentenced to three consec-
utive life sentences. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1371 (Fla. 1981), rev'd, Enmund v.
Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982). Enmund's common-law wife testified at the trial and was
given immunity from prosecution. Id. at 1367.
9 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(l)(a) (West 1976), states:
The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated from a premeditated de-
sign to effect the death of the person killed or any human being, or when committed by a
person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, invol-
untary sexual battery, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throw-
ing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb, or which resulted from the
unlawful distribution of heroin by a person 18 years of age or older when such drug is
proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user, shall be murder in the first
degree and shall constitute a capital felony, punishable as provided in § 775.082.
10 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3370 (quoting Florida trial court).
II Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d at 1363.
1554 [Vol. 73
1982] DEATH PENALTY AND NONTRIGGERMEN 1555
trial judge sentenced Enmund to death.' 2 The judge found that four
statutory aggravating circumstances' 3 applied to Enmund: the capital
felony was committed while Enmund was engaged in or was the accom-
plice in the commission of an armed robbery,' 4 the capital felony was
committed for pecuniary gain,' 5 the capital felony was especially hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel, 16 and Enmund had previously been convicted
of a felony involving the use or threat of violence.' 7 The court also
found that no statutory mitigating circumstances applied.' 8 Finally, the
12 Id. In cases where a capital crime (one in which the death penalty may be imposed)
has been committed, Florida requires that a separate sentencing hearing be held to determine
whether the accused will be executed or sentenced to life imprisonment. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(1) (West 1981). In the sentencing portion of the trial, the jury serves only in an
advisory capacity, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West 1981), with the ultimate decision be-
ing in the hands of the trial judge. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 1981). If the judge
decides to impose the death penalty, he or she is required to make a written statement regard-
ing his or her findings, and he or she must find that there are insufficient mitigating circum-
stances to outweigh the aggravating ones. Id.
13 The statutory aggravating circumstances are set out in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)
(West 1981):
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under a sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony in-
volving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an ac-
complice, in the commission of, or attempt to commit, of flight after committing or at-
tempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy
or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(i) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.
14 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(d) (West 1981).
15 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)( 0 (West 1981).
16 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West 1981).
17 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(b) (West 1981).
18 The statutory mitigating circumstances are set out in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)
(West 1981):
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and
his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another
person.
(0 The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
trial judge found that Enmund had participated directly in the murder
of the Kerseys, stating:
Since the defendant Jeanette Armstrong was seriously wounded and since
both Mr. and Mrs. Kersey were each shot with the bullets from two (2)
different caliber guns ... it is only reasonable to conclude, and the Court
so finds, that the defendant Enmund and the defendant Sampson Arm-
strong each fired into the bodies of Mr. and Mrs. Kersey. 19
The decision to sentence Enmund to death was subject to a
mandatory review by the Florida Supreme Court.20 That court noted
that "the only evidence of the degree of [Enmund's] participation is the
jury's likely inference that he was the person in the car by the side of the
road near the scene of the crimes."' 21 However, the court rejected En-
mund's claim that since he did not shoot the Kerseys, he should be
found guilty of only second degree murder under Florida's felony mur-
der rule.22 The court explained that the "felony murder rule and the
law of principals combine to make a felon generally responsible for the
lethal acts of his co-felon."'23 Since Enmund was constructively present,
aiding and abetting the crime of robbery, he was held responsible under
the felony murder rule for the acts of Sampson Armstrong.
24
The court further held that two of the aggravating circumstances
found by the trial court were inapplicable. First, the court said that the
trial court's findings that (1) the murder occurred during an armed rob-
bery and (2) the crime was committed for pecuniary gain referred to the
same aspect of Enmund's crime. It was, therefore, improper to treat
19 Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1372 (Fla. 1981).
20 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West 1981).
21 Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d at 1370.
22 The Florida Supreme Court has said that:
The historic felony murder rule mechanically defines as murder any homicide commit-
ted while perpetrating or attempting a felony. It stands as an exception to the general
rule that murder is homicide with the specific intent of malice aforethought. Under the
felony murder rule, state of mind is immaterial. Even an accidental killing during a
felony is murder. The malice aforethought is supplied by the felony, and in this manner
the rule is regarded as a constructive malice device.
Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d 765, 767-68 (Fla. 1976) (footnotes omitted) cert. denied, 434 U.S.
878 (1977).
23 Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d at 1369 (quoting Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d at 768-69).
Enmund is considered to be a principal in the second degree, which is defined as one who aids
and abets the commission of a crime. If one is deemed to be a principal in the second degree,
the person is penalized as if he or she had committed the crime. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
CRIMINAL LAW, § 63, at 495-98 (1972). In Lockelt, the Court invoked the law of principals to
uphold the murder conviction of Sandra Lockett. Before a felon may be convicted of murder
in Ohio the prosecution must prove that the murderer intended to kill his or her victim.
However, once the killer is convicted of murder, his or her accomplices may also be held
responsible without regard to their intent. See Comment, The Felony Murder Rule in Ohio, 17
OHIO ST. L.J. 130 (1956).
24 Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d at 1370.
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these findings as separate aggravating circumstances. 25 Second, the
court found that the evidence did not support the claim that the crime
was particularly heinous or cruel.26 Nevertheless, the court upheld the
imposition of the death penalty because two aggravating circumstances
still applied and no mitigating circumstances existed.
27
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether the death penalty may be imposed under the eighth amend-
ment against "one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor in-
tended to take life."' 28 Justice White, writing for the majority,2 9 applied
the disproportionality analysis the Court had used in Coker30 to test the
constitutionality of the punishment imposed against Enmund. As in
Coker, the Court discussed what it called "objective factors": legislative
judgments on the permissibility of the death penalty in vicarious felony
murder cases and jury sentencing patterns in vicarious felony murder
cases.
3 1
In its review of legislative judgments the Court noted that thirty-six-
state and federal jurisidictions authorize the imposition of the death
penalty.3 2 The Court said that nine states allow the death penalty to be
25 Id. at 1373.
26 Id.
27 Justice Overton dissented and would have remanded the case for resentencing in light
of the determination that Enmund did not shoot the Kerseys. Id.
28 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3371 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at i, 102 S. Ct. 3368
(1982)).
29 Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in the opinion. Justice
Brennan also filed a concurring opinion.
30 Justice White wrote the plurality opinion in Coker.
31 The objective test has its roots in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, the
Court noted:
Thus, an assessment of contemporary values concerning the infliction of [the death pen-
alty) is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment ...
T .. ]his assessment does not call for a subjective judgment. It requires, rather,
that we look to objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.
Id. at 173.
32 In three of these 36 jurisdictions felony murder was not a capital crime. In nine other
states the death penalty could be imposed solely for participation in a robbery in which the
defendant's co-felon took another's life. Eleven other states required some showing of the
defendant's culpable mental state. While eight of these states made intentional, purposeful,
knowing or premeditated killing an essential element of the crime, the three other states re-
quired a showing of a culpable mental state short of intent, such as recklessness, before the
death penalty could be imposed. One other jurisdiction barred the death penalty where the
accused was not the one who had actually killed. Two other jurisdictions allowed the co-
felon's minor participation in the crime to be used as a defense to preclude the death penalty.
One state limited the death penalty to circumstances not involved in the Enmund case. Nine
other jurisdictions allowed the imposition of the death penalty for felony murder, but re-
15571982]
1558 SUPREME CO UR T RE VIE W [Vol. 73
imposed solely for participation in a felony where one of the convicted
person's co-felons killed a human being.33 Nine other states allow the
death penalty to be imposed in cases where aggravating circumstances
in addition to the initial felony existed.3 4 None of these eighteen states
require a showing of intent before a nontriggerman can be executed.
Justice White observed that the legislative judgment on the permissibil-
ity of the death penalty for rape, discussed in Coker,35 was more compel-
ling than the legislative judgment discussed in Enmund. Nevertheless,
the legislative judgment on the permissibility of the death penalty for
vicarious felony murder "weighs on the side of rejecting capital punish-
ment for the crime at issue," since the eighteen aforementioned states
only constituted about a third of American jurisdictions.
3 6
The Court's analysis of jury determinations was more convincing.
The Court stated that "[t]he evidence is overwhelming that American
juries have repudiated imposition of the death penalty for crimes such as
petitioner's. 3 7 The Court noted that since 1954, there have been only
362 executions for homicide, and of this group only six nontriggermen
have been executed. The last execution of a known nontriggerman oc-
curred in 1955.38 The Court also noted that of the 796 inmates on death
row for homicide as of October 1, 1981, only three individuals (includ-
ing Enmund) were not physically present at the killing or did not par-
ticipate in a plot to kill.
3 9
quired that the court find additional aggravating circumstances before the death penalty
could be imposed. Id. at 3372-74.
33 Florida is included in this group.
34 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3374. The aggravating circumstances vary from state
to state. Florida's scheme is fairly typical. See supra note 18.
35 In Coker, only one state allowed the death penalty to be applied in cases of rape. 433
U.S. at 594, 595-96.
36 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3374.
37 Id. at 3375.
38 Id. In Coker, the Court noted that between 1973 and 1977, only six people had been
sentenced to death in Georgia for rape. 433 U.S. at 597. Ironically, in Enmund, the Court
noted that between 1955 and 1977, 72 people were executed for rape. Enmund v. Florida, 102
S. Ct. at 3375.
39 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3375. Of the 45 felony murderers on death row in
Florida at that time there were 36 cases in which the court had found that the defendant had
had an intent to kill. In eight of the nine remaining cases the felony murderer was the trigger-
man. Enmund was the only person on Florida's death row who was a nontriggerman who did
not intend to kill. Id. at 3376.
The Court also responded to the dissent's charge that the statistics on jury determina-
tions were inadequate because they did not indicate how many times the prosecution had
sought the death penalty for vicarious felony murder but was rebuffed by the jury. The
Court said that although it doubted such statistics existed, the statistics would be relevant if
they showed that prosecutors did not seek the death penalty, for it would indicate a societal
unwillingness to use the death penalty in cases such as Enmund. The dissent also charged that
the statistics were inadequate because they did not show how many felony murderers (both
triggermen and nontriggermen) were sentenced to death absent a finding of intent. The
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The Court then exercised its own independent judgment concern-
ing the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty upon Enmund,
noting, "it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment
permits imposition of the death penalty . . . ."4 The Court said that,
"[t]he question before us is not the disproportionality of death as a pen-
alty for murder, but rather the validity of capital punishment for En-
mund's own conduct. The focus must be on hzi culpability, not on that
of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims . ". .. , The
Court then drew an analogy between the crime of rape and armed rob-
bery. The analysis in Coker was based in large part on the fact that the
rape victim was not killed. Similarly, the Court in Enmund noted,
"'[t]he murderer kills; the [robber], if no more than that, does not. Life
is over for the victim of the murderer; for the [robbery] victim, life...
is not over and normally is not beyond repair.' ",42 The Court stated
that although armed robbery is a serious crime, it would be excessive to
punish it with death.43
The Court added that, "[i]t is fundamental that 'causing harm in-
tentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm
unintentionally.'"44 The Court noted that although Enmund's culpa-
bility was very different from that of robbers who have killed, both have
been sentenced to death. Thus, the Court concluded that it was imper-
missible for the State to treat Enmund in the same manner as it had
treated the triggerman.
45
Finally, the Court stated that "'the death penalty is said to serve
two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital
crimes by prospective offenders.' "46 The Court observed that Coker es-
tablished the proposition that unless the death penalty measurably con-
tributes to one or both of these goals it "'is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering'. . .. .- 7 In
Enmund, the Court said that the imposition of the death penalty for vica-
rious felony murder would not deter others from committing the crime.
First, it cited evidence that only one half of one percent of all robberies
Court responded that the statistics were tailored only to prove Enmund's assertion that death
is rarely imposed as a penalty against nontriggermen. Id.
40 Id. (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 3377 (emphasis in original).
42 Id. (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598).
43 In Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974), afd, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976), the Georgia Supreme Court declared that the death penalty could not be imposed
for armed robbery since it was rarely imposed for that crime.
44 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3377 (quoting H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPON-
SIBILITY 162 (1968)).
45 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
46 Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (footnote omitted)).
47 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3377 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592).
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resulted in homicide. 4 This fact, coupled with the infrequent imposi-
tion of the death penalty for vicarious felony murder, insured that fear
of the death penalty did not enter into the "'cold calculus that precedes
the decision to act.' -49
The Court also said that retribution could not justify the imposition
of the death penalty in Enmund. The Court noted that retribution is
linked to an individual's culpability, and the American criminal justice
system "has long considered a defendant's intention-and therefore his
moral guilt-to be critical to 'the degree of [his] criminal culpabil-
ity.' "50 The Court decided that executing Enmund for a murder which
he did not commit and which he had no intention of committing would
not "measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the
criminal gets his just deserts." 5' Thus, the Court reversed and re-
manded the case to the Florida Supreme Court.
B. THE DISSENT
Justice O'Connor in her dissent 52 stated that she too would remand
the case for further proceedings. Justice O'Connor's dissent, however,
employed a completely different rationale than the majority opinion.
Although Justice O'Connor admitted that Enmund's statistics concerning
jury determinations were impressive on their face, she attacked their ad-
equacy since they did not indicate how often juries have refused to im-
pose the death penalty when it was sought by the prosecution. 53
Second, she claimed that the statistics were incomplete due to the fact
that they did not indicate how many felony murderers (triggermen and
nontriggermen) were sentenced to death absent a finding of intent.54
Justice O'Connor also noted that at least twenty-one states-almost
two-thirds of the states which permit the death penalty-allowed the
death penalty to be imposed for vicarious felony murder absent a find-
ing of intent.55 She observed "that the petitioner has failed to meet the
standards in Coker and Woodson that the 'two crucial indicators of evolv-
ing standards of decency. . . jury determinations and legislative enact-
48 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3378.
49 Id. at 3377-78 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186).
50 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3378 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698
(1975)).
51 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3378.
52 The Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist joined in the opinion.
53 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). If a complete statisti-
cal analysis were done, it is unlikely that the study would support Justice O'Connor's argu-
ment on this point. Studies indicate that juries are reluctant to impose the death penalty in
felony murder cases. Kalven and Zeisel, The AmerianJuq and the Death Penalty, 33 U. CHI. L.
REV. 769 (1966).
54 Compare with the majority response to these arguments, supra note 39.
55 Compare to the majority's figures, supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
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ments--both point conclusively to the repudiation' of capital punishment
for felony murder."56 She concluded that the "objective factors" indi-
cated that "our 'evolving standards of decency' still embrace capital
punishment for this crime."
'57
Justice O'Connor next observed that the concept of proportionality
requires more than a measurement of "objective factors"; the Court
must also determine if "the penalty imposed in a capital case [is] propor-
tional to the harm caused and the defendant's blameworthiness."58 She
argued that the harm in this case was greater than the harm in Coker,
and that Enmund could not claim "that the penalty imposed is 'grossly
out of proportion' to the harm for which he admittedly is at least partly
responsible. '5 9 She disagreed with the Court's characterization of En-
mund as a robber, noting that he had been deemed legally responsible
for the deaths of both Mr. and Mrs. Kersey.6°
Finally, Justice O'Connor criticized the Court for injecting the ele-
ment of intent into federal constitutional law, thereby "requiring this
Court both to review highly subjective definitional problems customa-
rily left to state criminal law and to develop an Eighth Amendment
meaning of intent."'61 She observed that while the concept of propor-
tionality requires some connection between blameworthiness and pun-
ishment, the Court did not adequately explain why the eighth
amendment required the finding of an intent to kill.62 She noted that
the intent-to-kill requirement is "crudely crafted," for "it fails to take
into account the complex picture of the defendant's knowledge of his
accomplice's intent and whether he was armed, the defendant's contri-
bution to the planning and success of the crime, and the defendant's
actual participation during the commission of the crime."'63 Justice
O'Connor stated that the Court did not demonstrate why the eighth
amendment concept of proportionality would not be satisfied here by a
showing of an intent to commit an armed robbery combined with the
knowledge that armed robberies present a substantial risk of death.
64
She further noted that notions of guilt are complicated, and that the
factfinder, and not the Supreme Court, is in the best position to deal
with cases on an individual basis. She concluded, therefore, that the trial
56 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976)) (emphasis in Enmund).
57 Id.
58 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3390-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).








judge's decision to impose the death penalty was not disproportional to
the crime.
65
Justice O'Connor stated, however, that she would remand the case.
She cited Lockett v. Ohio, in which the Court noted that "'the sentencer,
in all but the rarest kind of capital case, [may] not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any. . . circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' "66
Justice O'Connor concluded that the trial judge's misunderstanding of
Enmund's role in the killing prevented the trial court from properly de-
ciding whether he should be executed.
67
IV. ANALYSIS
A. ENMUND AND PRIOR SUPREME COURT CASES
In Enmund v. Florida, the Court reached the proper decision in a
slightly unsatisfactory manner. The Court unnecessarily confused the
Coker test, which had established that a punishment is excessive if it:
(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment
and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime. A punishment [may] fail the test on either ground.68
In Enmund, however, the two tests became blended together. In Coker,
the Court never answered the question of whether the death penalty for
rape contributed to the acceptable goals of punishment. 69 The Court in
Enmund determined that the death penalty did not contribute to the
acceptable goals of punishment. 70 However, the Court made this deter-
mination in the context of its discussion of disproportionality. 71 Al-
though a penalty can clearly fail both prongs of the Coker test, the Court,
for the sake of clarity, should have indicated that the punishment failed
the Coker test on both grounds.
The Court's approach to the disporportionality analysis is unique
in other ways. The history of the disproportionality analysis can be
traced back to Weems v. United States,72 in which the Court first recog-
65 Id. at 3392.
66 Id. at 3393 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 604) (footnotes omitted).
67 Id. at 3394.
68 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
69 Id. at 592 n.4.
70 See infra text accompanying notes 46-51.
71 The dissent never discussed the majority's contention that the penalty did not serve the
acceptable goals of punishment.
72 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In Weems, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Phil-
lipine punishment ofcadena temporal for the crime of falsifying public documents. This punish-
ment included imprisonment and hard labor for a minimum of 12 years and one day in
chains, the loss of certain civil liberties and lifetime surveillance of the individual.
1562 [Vol. 73
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nized that the cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibited not only
punishments which are inhumane, such as torture, but also punishments
which are excessive in light of the seriousness of the offense. The Court
in Weems also recognized that the constitutional concept of cruel and
unusual punishment is not static. Instead, the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause "may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes en-
lightened by a humane justice. ' 73 In Trop v. Dulles,74 the plurality
observed that the content of the eighth amendment is determined by the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 75 The "evolving standards of decency" test was given a struc-
tural framework in Gregg v. Georgia,76 in which the Court examined both
legislative judgments and jury sentencing patterns before deciding that
the eighth amendment does not bar the imposition of the death penalty
for deliberate murder.
Coker was the first case in which the disproportionality analysis was
applied to strike down the imposition of the death penalty for a particu-
lar crime. In Coker, the delineation between the "objective factors" and
the Court's independent eighth amendment analysis became sharp.
The Court stressed the importance of the independent analysis, stating,
"we seek guidance in history and. . .[other] objective evidence. ..,77
to "confirm. . .our own judgment.
'78
In Enmund, the Court noted that although objective factors "weigh
heavily in the balance," 79 the ultimate decision concerning the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty for vicarious felony murder rested with
the Court. The Court's emphasis on its independent analysis is impor-
tant, since Enmund raises the question of just how strong the "objective
factors" must be before a penalty is impermissible. The dissent, in con-
trast, viewed the objective analysis in extremely rigid terms; Justice
O'Connor would be unwilling to find that the death penalty for a par-
ticular crime violates our national "standards of decency" unless both
legislative judgments and jury sentencing patterns indicated conclu-
sively that society is opposed to the imposition of the death penalty.80
The majority in Enmund, on the other hand, seems to ratify the Coker
approach, which considers "objective factors" to be important, but not
dispositive. As discussed above, the Court's conclusion in Enmund was
weakly supported by the legislative judgments on the applicability of
73 Id. at 378.
74 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
75 Id. at 101.
76 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Se supra note 43.
77 Coker, 433 U.S. at 593.
78 Id. at 597.
79 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3376.
80 See supra text accompanying note 56.
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the death penalty for vicarious felony murder. Even Justice White's
figures indicate that about half of the jurisdictions which permit the
death penalty would probably have allowed the imposition of the death
penalty in Enmund.81 The Court's decision, however, was strongly sup-
ported by jury sentencing patterns.
8 2
Enmund altered the disproportionality analysis used in Coker in an-
other important way. In Coker, the Court emphasized that the death
penalty is an excessive punishment for rape since rape does not involve
the death of another person.8 3 In Enmund, however, the emphasis was
not on the harm caused by felony murder, but on Enmund's moral re-
sponsibility for the death of the Kerseys. The Court characterized En-
mund as an armed robber. Paraphrasing Coker, the Court said that it
would be excessive to execute Enmund for the crime of armed robbery
since armed robbery does not involve the death of another person. 84 In
Enmund, however, two people did die. Perhaps, then, before the Court
could classify Enmund as only an armed robber it was necessary for the
Court impliedly to assume that Enmund's responsibility for the Kersey's
deaths was not great enough to justify the imposition of the death pen-
alty. Thus, Enmund is significant because the Court appears to base its
decision not on the actual harm caused, but on its perception of En-
mund's moral responsibility for the harm.
B. ENMUND AND THE ISSUE OF INTENT
The Court's discussion in Enmund of the issue of criminal intent is
confusing. Throughout its history, the Court has failed to approach
questions of criminal intent in a systematic and consistent manner. One
commentator has characterized the Court's approach to issues of crimi-
nal intent by saying that, "Mens rea is an important requirement, but it
is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes."8 5 This criticism
is supported by analyzing a number of Supreme Court cases. For in-
stance, the Court in Robinson v. Caliomia,86 ruled that a law which made
drug addiction a criminal offense, regardless of whether the person be-
came voluntarily addicted, violated the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Noting that narcotics addiction
is an illness, the Court stated, "in the light of contemporary human
81 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 37-39 and accompanying text.
83 Although the Court did mention that the "moral depravity" of the rapist is not as great
as the depravity of the murderer, the opinion stressed the fact that no one died. 433 U.S. at
598.
84 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
85 Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, Sup. CT. REv. 107 (1962).
86 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would
doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
'8 7
In Powell v. Texas,88 however, the Court greatly limited the applica-
tion of Robinson. In Powell, the Court decided that a state could constitu-
tionally punish a chronic alcoholic for public intoxication. The Court
distinguished Robinson by claiming that the decision only applied to
cases where the state punished people for the "status" of addiction.8 9
Moreover, Powell held that the public acts of addicts and alcoholics
could be punished.90 Thus, although one could not be punished for be-
ing an alcoholic, an alcoholic could be punished for being drunk in pub-
lic. The Court further observed that:
[T]his Court has never articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens
rea .... The doctrines of actus reus, rnens rea, insanity, mistake, justifica-
tion, and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shift-
ing adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal
law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the
nature of man. This process of adjustment has always been thought to be
the province of the States.9'
Cases such as Powell and Robinson demonstrate the Court's schizo-
phrenic approach to questions of criminal responsibility. The Court,
however, has occasionally required a showing of criminal intent in cases
where it found that an important constitutional right was at stake.92 In
Enmund, where the life and death of a human being was at issue, it seems
particularly appropriate for the Court to hold that the Constitution
mandates a finding of intent. The Court has often spoken of the unique
nature of the death penalty, stating that it differs from other permissible
punishments "in both its severity and its finality. '93 Because of its sever-
ity and finality, it seems excessive to punish an individual with death
87 Id. at 666.
88 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion).
89 Id. at 532.
90 Id. at 532-33.
91 Id. at 535-36 (footnotes omitted).
92 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), in which the Court, in protecting first
amendment rights, struck down an obscenity ordinance which did not have a scienter re-
quirement. See also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), in which the Court struck
down a Los Angeles Municipal Code ordinance which made it a crime for people previously
convicted of a felony to fail to register with the police. The Court ruled that a registration act
of this character violates due process when it is applied to people who have no knowledge of
their duty to register. Although the rights of free speech and due process, at issue in Smith and
Lambert, are important, the need for judicial scrutiny is perhaps at its greatest in cases involv-
ing the imposition of the death penalty. As the Court has stated, "the action of the sovereign
in taking the life of one of its citizens. . . differs dramatically from any other legitimate state
action." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (plurality opinion).
93 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357.
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when the individual did not intend to kill another person but only in-
tended to commit an armed robbery.
There are also policy reasons for requiring a showing of intent in
vicarious felony murder cases. The American Law Institute has sug-
gested that the felony murder rule should be abolished (in both capital
and noncapital cases) because it is at variance with the general principle
of American criminal justice that the "[p]unishment for homicide ob-
tains only when the deed is done with a state of mind that makes it
reprehensible as well as unfortunate. '94 Of course, the Court in Enmund
did not conclude that the felony murder rule is always unconstitutional;
it held only that the death penalty is an inappropriate punishment for
vicarious felony murder absent a showing of intent. Yet, the death pen-
alty should only be imposed, if ever, to punish the most heinous crimes.
Armed robbery is committed every day, and to apply the death penalty
in the unusual case where deadly violence erupts,95 particularly where
the accused did not commit the physical act of killing, seems overly
harsh.9
6
The Court's failure, however, to define "intent" will undoubtedly
cause confusion in the future. The word "intent" is hardly capable of
simple definition. For example, suppose that an individual aided and
abetted an arson in which a number of people died. The arsonists may
not have "intended" to kill anyone. However, if the arsonists knew that
others were in the building, it is difficult to argue that they are not re-
sponsible for the deaths.
There are a number of possible interpretations of the word "in-
tent." LaFave and Scott have identified four basic categories of murder
recognized in the United States: "(1) [i]ntent-to-kill murder; (2) intent-
to-do-serious-bodily-injury murder; (3) depraved-heart murder; and (4)
felony murder. '97 Obviously, under Enmund the death penalty cannot
be imposed for felony murder where a nontriggerman did not intend to
94 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment 6, at 36 (1980). In discussing the felony murder
rule the American Law Institute stated:
This doctrine aside, the criminal law does not predicate liability simply on conduct caus-
ing the death of another ...
The felony-murder rule contradicts this scheme. It bases conviction of murder not
on any proven culpability with respect to homicide but on liability for another crime.
The underlying felony carries its own penalty and the additional punishment for murder
is therefore gratuitous-gratuitous, at least, in terms of what must have been proved at
trial in a court of law.
Id.
95 See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3378 n.24.
96 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment 6, at 36 (1980). The American Law Insti-
tute stated: "Murder is invariably punished as a heinous offense and is the principal crime for
which the death penalty is authorized. Sanctions of such gravity demand justification, and
their imposition must be premised on the confluence of conduct and culpability." Id. at 36.
97 W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, supra note 23, at 528.
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kill. LaFave and Scott define intent-to-kill murder as "[c]onduct, accom-
panied by an intent to kill, which legally causes another's death ... ."98
This type of murder would probably be included under the Enmund defi-
nition of intent.
The other two categories of murder present problems in determin-
ing what type of intent is required before the death penalty may be
imposed. Intent-to-do-serious-bodily-injury murder is defined as
"[c]onduct . . . accompanied by an intent to do serious bodily injury
but without an intent to kill, which legally causes another's
death. . .. ,,99 It is unclear whether this type of murder would be in-
cluded in the Court's definition of "intent."
The same uncertainty is presented by depraved-heart murder, de-
fined as:
Extremely negligent conduct, which creates what a reasonable man
would realize to be not only an .injustifiable but also a very high degree of
risk of death or serious bodily injury to another or to others-though unac-
companied by an intent to kill or do serious bodily injury-and which
actually causes the death of another .... 00
Would the Enmund requirement of "intent" include criminal activity
such as the arson example mentioned earlier which threatens the lives of
others, but where the arsonists have no specific design to kill?
Although Justice White does not address this issue, his concurrence
in Lockett may provide some insight into his meaning of "intent."101 His
concurrence in Lockett is similar to his majority opinion in Enmund since
in both cases he claimed that it constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment to impose the death penalty absent a finding of intent. He noted
in Lockett, that "the type of conduct which Ohio would punish by death
requires at most the degree of mens rea defined by the American Law
Institute Model Penal Code as recklessness: conduct undertaken with
knowledge that death is likely to follow. 10 2 Justice White argued that
where the death penalty is to be imposed, the Constitution requires
more than a showing of recklessness, because of the
vast difference between permitting a factfinder to consider a defendant's
willingness to engage in criminal conduct which poses a substantial risk of
death in deciding whether to infer that he acted with a purpose to take life,
and defining such conduct as an ultimate fact equivalent to possessing a
purpose to kill as Ohio has done.1
03
98 Id. at 535.
99 Id. at 540.
100 Id. at 541.
101 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 621 (1978) (White J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
102 Id. at 627-28 (footnote omitted).
103 Id. at 627.
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Justice White, then, appears to have a narrow definition of "intent".
Thus he would not likely include depraved-heart murder and intent-to-
do-serious-bodily-injury murder as crimes for which the death penalty
could be imposed. It is unfortunate that the Court in Enmund did not
define "intent" with more precision.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF ENMUND
The Court's careful phrasing of the issue in Enmund limits the deci-
sion to nontriggermen. The Court states a number of times that En-
mund could not be sentenced to death since he did not kill, attempt to
kill, or intend to kill.10 4 Yet, the Court may one day be confronted with
the related issue of whether the death penalty can be imposed on a trig-
german who accidentally kills another person during the commission of a
felony. One would hope that the Court would find that the death pen-
alty may not be applied in this situation. It seems artificial to distin-
guish between nontriggermen and triggermen. The moral culpability of
the triggerman who accidentally kills during the commission of a felony
is essentially no different from the moral guilt of the nontriggerman who
does not intend to kill.' 0 5 The difference between the triggerman who
kills without intent and the nontriggerman who kills without intent, is
that the triggerman committed the physical act of killing. The felon
who drops his or her gun during the commission of a felony, thereby
causing the death of another person, does not intend the death of the
victim any more than the nontriggerman who does not take part in the
actual killing or who does not intend the death to occur. Since the
Court in Enmund stated that the factfinder must delve into the intent of
those who aid the triggerman, it seems equitable to delve into the intent
of the triggerman as well.1
0 6
It may be argued that if the state is forced to prove intent in every
case of felony murder there will probably be a great number of instances
where even intentional killers will not be subject to the death penalty. 
0 7
104 See supra note 39.
105 The Supreme Court in Enmund stated that "[i]t is fundamental that 'causing harm in-
tentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.'"
Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3377 (quoting H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBIL-
ITY 162 (1968)). However, if triggermen are sentenced to death for accidental killings, they
will be punished as severely as intentional killers. Although the triggerman, unlike the non-
triggerman, is physically responsible for the death of another human being, some commenta-
tors argue that criminal law should not consider the causing of the death of another to be
murder if the intent to kill is absent. See supra note 94.
106 The Court noted that the evidence of jury sentencing patterns was tailored to prove
that society has rejected the death penalty for those who did not kill, intend to kill, or attempt
to kill. It is unclear, however, whether the "objective factors" would support the conclusion
that it is unconstitutional to execute triggermen absent a finding of intent.
107 Since the state of mind of the felony murderer was immaterial under the traditional
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However, these triggermen will still be subject to every appropriate pen-
alty short of death which may be imposed for murder. They will not go
unpunished. It is not unreasonable to require the state to prove an addi-
tional element of the offense-the intent of the individual-when it
wishes to impose the death penalty.108
Another important implication of Enmund is that it highlights the
divergent approaches the Court has taken in death penalty cases. Jus-
tice O'Connor correctly concludes that the case could have been decided
under Lockett and Eddings v. Oklahoma.'0 9 As mentioned above, Lockett
requires the trial court to consider any mitigating circumstance as a pos-
sible justification for not executing the defendant.'" 0 In Eddings, the
Court ruled that "[j]ust as the state may not by statute preclude the
sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sen-
tencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evi-
dence."'I't  Florida courts recognize that the trial court must consider
every mitigating circumstance proffered by the defendant. 112 However,
the trial judge's misunderstanding of Enmund's role in the crime pre-
vented him from deciding whether Enmund's limited participation in
the murder of the Kerseys rendered the imposition of the death penalty
inappropriate. "1
3
This misunderstanding was not corrected by the Florida Supreme
Court's acknowledgement that Enmund was not present when the
murders occurred, since the court never discussed whether Enmund's
lack of participation in the killings would have justified the overturning
of his death sentence. The cursory review of Enmund's death sentence
by the Florida Supreme Court does not appear to meet the requirements
of Lockett and Eddings." 14
felony murder rule, set supra note 22, the state was not required to prove that the felony
murderer intended to kill. However, under Enmund it will be harder to sentence a nontrig-
german to death since the state must now demonstrate that the nontriggerman intended the
victim to die. Considering the difficulties presented by having to prove intent, the chance
that intentional killers will avoid the death penalty is increased.
108 This approach would not change the elements of felony murder where the death pen-
alty will not be imposed. The Court has recognized the inapplicability of death penalty deci-
sions to questions concerning non-capital crimes. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
t09 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982). For further discussion of Eddings, see Note, Eighth Amendment-
Minors and the Death Penalty: Decision and Avoidance, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1525
(1982).
110 See supra text accompanying note 66.
I1I Eddngs, 102 S. Ct. at 875-76 (emphasis in original).
112 Songer v. State, 365 So. 2d 696, 700 (Fla. 1978).
113 See supra text accompanying note 19.
114 Justice O'Connor observed that:
The Florida Supreme Court's opinion fails to correct this error either by remanding
for new sentencing or by evaluating the impact of the trial court's fundamental mis-
perception of the petitioner's role in the killings. Rather, the court simply repeats three
times, without any discussion of the evidence, that there are "no mitigating circum-
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The Court did not, however, follow this straightforward analysis.' 15
Instead, Justice White's opinion clearly establishes him as the champion
of the disproportionality approach. Both Coker and Enmund reflect Jus-
tice White's belief in the need for strict guidelines to aid the sentencer in
determining whether the death penalty should be imposed.
Furthermore, Justice White's preference for strict guidelines can be
seen in his concurrence in Lockett. He stated:
By requiring as a matter of constitutional law that sentencing authorities
be permitted to consider and in their discretion to act upon any and all
mitigating circumstances, the Court permits them to refuse to impose the
death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime. This invites
a return to the pre-Furman days when the death penalty was generally re-
served for those very few for whom society has least consideration.' 
16
Justice White has consistently attack the problem of inconsistent appli-
cation of the death penalty since his concurring opinion in Furman v.
Georgia,117 in which he stated that it is unconstitutional to impose the
death penalty in an infrequent and arbitrary manner. He noted in
Furman, that if the death penalty is imposed infrequently, its imposition
"will make little contribution to deterring those crimes for which it may
be exacted." 1t8
If the object of sentencing is to reach fair and consistent decisions,
the open-ended approach advocated by the Court in recent decisions
such as Eddigs will not help the sentencing authority reach that goal. If
lack of intent may be viewed only as a mitigating factor, and not as an
absolute bar to imposition of the death penalty, courts will not be able
to apply the death penalty for vicarious felony murder in an even-
handed manner. The statistics the Court relied on in Enmund demon-
strate that the death penalty has been infrequently imposed for
vicarious felony murder. If the sentencing authority is allowed to treat
stances." 399 So. 2d at 1373. In light of the court's dramatically different factual find-
ings, this review is inadequate to satisfy the Lockett principle.
Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3394 n.46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
115 The Florida Supreme Court's decision was deficient in another manner. In Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of Florida's death
sentencing scheme, the United States Supreme Court noted with approval that the Florida
Supreme Court would review the decisions of trial judges to "ensure that they are consistent
with other sentences imposed in similar circumstances." Id. at 253. An examination of the
number of nontriggermen on death row would have probably led the Florida Supreme Court
to overturn Enmund's death sentence. See supra note 39. In Enmund, however, the Florida
Supreme Court never discussed the number of times Florida has imposed the death penalty
for vicarious felony murder.
116 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 623 (1978) (White, J., concurring and dissenting in
part).
117 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 312.
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the lack of intent as a mitigating circumstance, the death penalty may
be imposed in an even more infrequent and arbitrary manner.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of past confusion concerning death penalty cases, the Court
was justified in its attempt in Enmund to provide the courts with clear
and definitive sentencing guidelines. Considering Enmund's limited
participation in the killing of the Kerseys and the infrequent infliction of
the death penalty in cases such as Enmund, the Court reached a just deci-
sion. It remains to be seen if the Court will take the same approach if it
addresses the question of whether it is constitutional to execute trig-
germen who do not intend to kill.
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